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Abstract :
Australia and Japan both have the United States (US) as their primary ally ; all three countries
have been developing closer defence ties through the Trilateral Security Dialogue (TSD) series of
diplomatic meetings. Under the Abe Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) government elected in
2012, Japan has been moving towards potential changes to its constitution, which would allow
greater cooperation by its Self-Defense Forces (SDF), with its allies. Following the 2013 Upper
House elections, the LDP has now secured a majority in both houses of the Diet, but still not
large enough yet to readily change the constitution. Nevertheless, the Abe government has re-
cently released its new national security strategy, which is increasing the size and operational ca-
pability of the SDF, and is overtly aimed at deterring the greater military activity of China in the
region, particularly over the disputed Senkaku Islands (claimed as the Diayous by China), in the
East China Sea. This could have profound implications for regional and international stability.
Greater use of the region’s diplomatic structures, such as APEC and the ASEAN Regional Fo-
rum (ARF), could complement more active diplomacy between the major powers of the region,
particularly the US, China, and Japan, which is required in order to avoid disputes escalating into
armed conflict.
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Introduction
In December 2012, the conservative LDP regained power in Japan after a three-year hiatus, winning
the Lower House elections for the Japanese parliament (known as the Diet). This article will outline
how the recent electoral success of the LDP has enabled Japan to continue a more active use of the
SDF, involving a higher level of operational cooperation with its allies ; primarily the US, but also
with other countries with close ties to Japan, particularly Australia. Their defence relationship has
become more formalised, through the Trilateral Security Dialogue (TSD). Returning to serve as
Prime Minister for a second time, Shinzo Abe has engaged in robust diplomacy, as well as eco-
nomic policy reform popularly termed ‘Abenomics’. The political success of the Abe government
was confirmed with a following victory in the July 2013 elections for the Upper House of the Diet.
In this election, the LDP secured a simple majority, but not a two-thirds majority ; therefore, the
Abe LDP government will not be able to easily pass legislation enabling changes to the constitution
at present. The LDP’s policy platform nevertheless advocates a number of potential constitutional
changes, should any such proposals to do so manage to be eventually passed with a simple majority
by the public at a referendum. The most controversial of these is to alter Article 9, the ‘pacifist
clause’ of the constitution, which has constrained Japan’s international use of force since its defeat
in the Second World War. Even before any such changes have been proposed, among various
security-related bills already passed, the Abe government’s new national security strategy envisions
a more assertive role for the SDF. However, the diplomatic infrastructure of the region, including
the TSD, has so far proved unable to ease worsening tensions in the Asia-Pacific over territorial dis-
putes and hegemonic competition, especially with China.
The Trilateral Security Dialogue (TSD)
Even without a direct, formal change to the constitution, the Abe LDP government has already im-
plemented a more activist defence and foreign policy ; this follows the trend embarked upon by
previous administrations since the 1990s, allowing a wider deployment of the Japanese SDF. This
has implications for a strategic development which has received relatively little attention in the Asia-
Pacific region, namely the increasing security cooperation between Australia and Japan. This has en-
trenched the deepening bilateral relations between the two countries, as Australia becomes an impor-
tant military, as well as political and economic partner with Japan (Anno, 2011 : 28).
The security relationship between Australia and Japan has steadily grown over the past two
decades, to the extent that Japan is now Australia’s second-closest security partner, after the US.
The Australian Defence Force (ADF) and JSDF have operated together in UN peacekeeping opera-
tions (PKOs), in Cambodia in 1993, in East Timor from 1999 ; and also in Iraq, in 2004−2006.
Joint naval exercises have increased, and both navies have cooperated in multinational antipiracy op-
erations in the Indian Ocean since 2009. More covertly, intelligence cooperation is believed to be
increasing. Confirming the direction of these closer security ties, the Japan-Australia Joint Declara-
tion on Security Cooperation was signed in 2007, upgraded to the treaty-level Acquisitions and
Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), in 2010 (Cook & Wilkins, 2011).
The consolidation of security relations between the common allies emerged with the com-
mencement of the TSD, held between the US, Japan and Australia. The TSD was first held at a sen-
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ior bureaucratic official level in 2002, and was upgraded to ministerial level from 2006, with a ‘2?
2’ meeting of the three members’ foreign and defense ministers (Burke, 2008 : 152−153). A formal
trilateral military alliance could therefore seem to be a logical progression. While this proposal
might seem to be advantageous from a ‘realist’ perspective, at present there seems little likelihood
of such a development. For all practical defense cooperation purposes, there is no need for a formal
trilateral alliance to carry out mutual operations, as evidenced in the recent history of joint military
exercises and deployments held among the three countries (Sato, 2010 : 154−162).
While a trilateral alliance would be an overt assertion of the already existing strong relations
among the three states, it would also have the diplomatic effect of generating further resentment
from China, which is already highly sensitive and suspicious about the USA’s strategic redeploy-
ments in the Pacific. For example, China has voiced firm disapproval of the US posting its forces
into increased training rotations in northern Australia (Stars & Stripes, 2012). China would certainly
view a new trilateral military alliance as further proof of a ‘containment’ strategy being waged
against it. On balance therefore, there would seem to be little practical gain, but potentially plenty of
diplomatic strife if an ‘AJUS’ (Australia-Japan-US) military alliance was formally pursued.
Such a trilateral alliance would also do little to settle contentious ongoing regional issues, such
as the maritime territorial disputes in the South China Sea. China claims the entire area, which is
contested by varying claims from Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, and Taiwan (LeVine,
2012). While neither Australia nor Japan has any direct part in these controversies, they do share a
very real interest in ensuring the shipping lanes of the South China Sea, through which most trade
and energy supplies flow, are not disrupted by any deterioration of stability in the Western Pacific
(Chye, 2012 : 113−118).
Japan’s Increasing Defense Activity
If such tensions deteriorate, there is likely to be continual implicit encouragement of Japan by the
US to change Article 9 of the Constitution, which restricts the use of military force overseas, and so
further allow expanded use of the SDF (Kersten, 2011 : 8). This has already been taking place, seen
in : SDF deployment to Iraq in 2004−2006 (largely under the protection of Australian military
forces) ; logistical support by the SDF for the ISAF mission in Afghanistan from 2001 ; and since
2009, ongoing participation by the SDF in international anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa
(Heazel, 2009 : 466−468). This has been extended to a support base being established by the SDF
in Djibouti in 2011, its first such overseas base since the Second World War (Martin, 2011). After
taking office in 2009, the social-democratic Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government followed
the overall foreign and defence policy trend of previous LDP administrations, of a more assertive
use of the SDF, encouraged by its core alliance partner the US. This has been driven by a more
challenging strategic position for Japan in the 21st century, as China increases its economic, and sub-
sequently military strength, and North Korea remains continually belligerent (Green, 2011 : 102−
103).
In the wake of the March 11 2011 Tohoku earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear disaster, a trauma-
tized Japan found even greater motivation to maintain its alliance with the USA, and underwrite its
national security. This endures, despite occasional difficulties such as the economic cost of burden
sharing of defence expenditure. The deployment of the controversial Osprey transport aircraft, and
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criminal attacks on locals by US military personnel have seen ongoing local protests over the US
military presence in Okinawa (The Mainichi, 2012). The US is hoping to defuse these tensions to an
extent, with plans to relocate 9,000 troops away from Okinawa to other Pacific locations, including
Guam and Australia. However, the US will maintain its forces in Okinawa and Japan overall, in-
cluding the contested Futenma air base ; so political opposition and resentment from the Okinawan
community towards the US military presence is not set to end (Mitchell, 2012).
However, the image of both the SDF and the US military was boosted in the response to the
2011 Tohoku disaster, which was generally considered to be prompt and efficient. SDF personnel
took a leading role in grim searches for tsunami victims, provided medical assistance and logistical
support, and assisted in containing the nuclear crisis at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant,
among many other aspects of disaster assistance and recovery. Over 100,000 SDF personnel were
mobilized, its largest ever deployment on active service. Over 24,000 US military personnel, 24 US
warships and 189 aircraft were also immediately dispatched following the disaster, in Operation To-
modachi (Friend) (IISS, 2012 : 221).
During the failed North Korean rocket test in April 2012, the SDF was placed on alert, deploy-
ing its PAC-3 Patriot anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems in Okinawa, and mobilising SDF forces
in Japan’s other southern islands (Asahi Shimbun, 2012). This confirmed a doctrinal shift following
the National Defence Program Guidelines (NDPG) announced by the DPJ government in 2010,
where Japan was already departing from its Cold War strategy of largely static anti-Soviet deter-
rence, to a more flexible, dynamic ‘western-facing’ deployment of the SDF. Japan is still yet to re-
solve its long-running territorial dispute with Russia over the Kurile Islands (Northern Territories),
although there are signs that negotiations towards finally settling a Russia-Japan Peace Treaty may
finally be advanced (IISS, 2012 : 220−222).
In light of these developments, a conventional arms race is already underway in the region, es-
pecially in maritime force projection (Norton-Taylor, 2012). The buildup in naval and air power,
missile technology, and numbers of nuclear weapons by China is perceived as a great long-term
strategic threat by Japan. Thus motivated, Japan is already developing a theatre ballistic missile de-
fence system (TBMD), in cooperation with the US (Togo, 2010 : 41−48).
Recent Japanese Politics and Constitutional Change
The LDP’s return to power on December 16, 2012 was a decisive defeat of the DPJ, led at the time
by Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda. The DPJ had defeated the LDP only as recently as 2009 ; how-
ever, widespread public disillusionment with the DPJ soon set in, due to its leadership instability,
with a new Prime Minister in each year of its government ; a continual sluggish economy, and most
traumatically, dealing with the impact of the 2011 Tohoku disaster (Shinoda, 2013 : 255−258). The
DPJ’s numbers in the lower house collapsed from 230 to 57 seats ; there was no great initial enthu-
siasm for the new LDP government though, reflected in the record low voter turnout of 59%, 10%
lower than for the 2009 election (Fackler, 2012). The dismal results for the DPJ were repeated in
the Tokyo municipal elections in June 2013, where the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) even out-
polled the DPJ (Warnock, 2013).
Shinzo Abe’s return to power was a rare event in Japanese politics, having stepped down from
a previous term as Prime Minister during the previous term of the LDP government. He had pre-
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sided for about a year during 2006−07, before resigning due to ‘illness’?although a series of gov-
ernment scandals and poor economic performance was widely considered the true reason. His re-
markable political comeback, having won a LDP leadership contest in 2012 during its previous pe-
riod in opposition, has enabled Abe to embark upon the LDP’s economic growth strategy plan,
strongly tied to his personal leadership. Popularly termed ‘Abenomics’, it comprises ‘three arrows’ :
quantitative easing ; stimulus spending ; and a complex series of structural economic reforms, in-
cluding a consumption tax increase, labour market and industry deregulation, and participation in the
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations. Targets for ‘Abenomics’ include sustainable inflation
and growth rates of 2% each by 2015 (Tepperman, 2013).
The Upper House election held on July 21, 2013 continued to build on the LDP’s political for-
tunes ; it secured a comfortable majority, winning 76 of the 121 available seats with its traditional
governing coalition partner, the New Komeito Party (NKP). The July election saw the continuing
decline of the DPJ, losing 27 seats, being too soon for any recovery from its poor image in the
wake of the 2012 defeat. Of the other minor parties, only the JCP and the nationalist Japan Restora-
tion Party (JRP) managed to increase their (low) numbers. Other small parties, such as the neoliberal
Your Party (YP), the populist People’s Life Party (PLP) (led by former LDP and DPJ powerbroker
and defector Ichiro Ozawa), and the left-leaning Social Democratic Party (SDP) and Midori no Kaze
(Green Wind) performed poorly, and so remained marginal, crowded out by the LDP’s sweeping
victory (The Japan Times, 2013 a). Despite its electoral success, the LDP was still not able to
achieve its ultimate desired goal of a two-thirds majority in its own right ; although the LDP will
still control all standing committees of the Diet. Voter turnout was even lower than in 2012 though,
at only 53% (The Economist, 2013).
Shinzo Abe and the LDP have long held a policy platform of more readily enabling changes to
the constitution, drafted during the post-war US occupation. The constitution has never been altered,
which the LDP argues shows its reform process is too sclerotic ; hence the need to allow easier
change, so governments can adapt policies and legislation for changing national circumstances. This
aim was pursued by Abe in his first administration in 2006−2007 ; a bill was passed to ease the re-
quirements for the public referendum which has to be held to confirm any vote in the Diet to
change the constitution. Now, only a simple majority is required to pass a referendum, rather than
the previous two-thirds majority (Kersten, 2012 : 37).
However, under Article 96 of the Constitution, a two-thirds majority vote is still required in
both Houses of the Diet to approve any such referendum for constitutional change. Once Article 96
is altered, the barrier would be lowered for further changes in other areas of the constitution, most
notably Article 9 (Hook, 2012 : 526). Since the 2013 election, a two-thirds majority vote led by the
LDP is now actually possible, if there is sufficient cooperation from minor parties, particularly the
YP and JRP, which are also generally in favour of constitutional change (although Your Party has
been split by a recent series of defections) (Yomiuri Shimbun, 2013).
Crucially through, the more pacifist-leaning NKP remains opposed ; so it remains the vital vot-
ing bloc likely to prevent revision of the constitution, frustrating the ambitions of the LDP into the
intermediate future. The other possibility for the LDP to achieve the numbers required would be if
the demoralised DPJ, which suffered a series of defections in the lead-up to the 2012 election, splits
even further, and a bloc of its more conservative-aligned members supports the LDP in sufficient
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numbers. However, the DPJ under its post-election leadership of Banri Kaieda, is unlikely to yield
to such pressure from the LDP, if it ever hopes to rebuild its electoral fortunes (Sieg, 2013).
Recent Development in Japanese Domestic Security Policy
Abe and the LDP nonetheless presently enjoys a commanding position of firm domestic political
dominance, as the opposition parties’ numbers in both houses of the Diet are too low to present any
major legislative impediment. This has been amply demonstrated in the Diet session held after the
July election, where legislation was recently passed by the LDP to establish Japan’s first National
Security Council (NSC) and National Security Bureau (NSB), modelled on the NSC of the USA, to
better coordinate responses to potential security crises (Kuromi and Tajima, 2013).
More controversial has been a bill passed to strengthen the protection of ‘state secrets’, amid
protests by opposition Diet members. There are now harsher penalties for the prosecution of public
servants who leak information, and for journalists who ‘encourage’ and publish such leaks. The
LDP government has justified stronger protection of state secrets on the grounds it will ensure
greater intelligence cooperation with Japan’s allies, particularly the USA, and strengthen national se-
curity overall, in light of the recent international whistleblowing cases of Edward Snowden, Chelsea
Manning, and Julian Assange’s Wikileaks organization (BBC, 2013).
Public protests were held against the state secrets bill by human rights groups, lawyers, media
outlets, authors and academics, concerned over the danger that freedom of expression may be
eroded. Critics of the bill consider there was a lack of consultation and proper scrutiny of the legis-
lation, effectively being ‘railroaded’ through the Diet. The Abe government has been vague about
which criteria of information could be considered state secrets, with potential for restrictions to be
expanded beyond areas such as defence, foreign affairs, espionage and intelligence. This could mean
anti-nuclear protesters, and those opposing the greater international use of force by Japan could find
themselves in breach of the law in future (McDonnell, 2013).
Criticism of government policies and handling of crises such as the Fukushima nuclear disaster
could also possibly face restrictions, reducing government accountability and transparency overall.
Human rights advocates also fear other potential changes on the LDP’s constitutional reform agenda,
including restrictions on freedom of speech and assembly, if such activities and associations ‘harm .
. . public order’ (Jones, 2013). Following the passage of the state security laws, Abe suffered a
10.3% drop in opinion poll approval ratings, admitting he could have explained its implementation
better?but with a recent approval rate of 47.6% for his Cabinet, this remains still far ahead of pre-
vious DPJ Cabinets, which generally struggled to get above 20% (Radio Australia, 2013).
More virulent nationalism among LDP politicians is also being expressed, seen in proposals for
the ‘government viewpoint’ to be presented in school history textbooks, resurrecting long-running
controversy about the treatment of Japan’s wartime history (The Asahi Shimbun, 2013 a). Visits by
LDP members to the controversial Yasukuni shrine, which honours Japan’s war dead, including war
criminals, have also continued. Such events strongly offend neighbouring states in the region, espe-
cially China and Korea, creating difficulties in improving relations with those countries ; however,
these demonstrations of nationalism pander to the conservative support base of the LDP, as it pro-
jects an image of assertiveness (McCurry, 2013).
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Recent Developments in Japanese Foreign and Defence Policy
Apart from securing the LDP’s domestic fortunes, Abe is dependent on the success of Abenomics to
provide the required economic and political capital to fulfil his nationalistic ambitions of restoring
Japan as a premier geostrategic nation in East Asia. The SDF is already one of the best-equipped
and most well-trained modern armed forces, at a strength of nearly 250,000, including large num-
bers of warships and aircraft, making it the third most powerful military force in the region, after
the USA and China, and the fifth largest defence budget, again after the US ($682 billion in 2012)
and China ($166 billion). A less noted component of Abenomics was an initial 3% increase in de-
fence spending to ¥4.89 trillion for FY 2013, the first increase in Japanese defence spending in
eleven years, and the highest amount of spending for 22 years. This increase has mainly been driven
by the territorial tensions with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which steadily deteriorated
after the previous DPJ government felt driven to fully ‘nationalise’ ownership of the islands in Oc-
tober 2012. Concerns have also increased over North Korea testing its nuclear warheads and ballistic
missiles, which prompted the SDF to go on alert on several occasions during 2012−13 (IISS, 2013 :
266−269, 306−309).
As well increasing military spending, the Abe government is changing the operational doctrine
of the SDF. This includes expanding the size of the Coast Guard and Maritime SDF (MSDF), seen
in the recent launch of its latest helicopter carrier, the largest warship acquired by the MSDF in the
post-war period, to be operational by 2015 (Lendon, 2013). A new security cooperation agreement
signed between the US and Japan has authorised the deployment of US surveillance drones based in
Japan. Further to this, large-scale amphibious landing joint exercises are being carried out between
the SDF and US forces, both in the US and Japan (Mie and Aoki, 2013).
These developments are part of the long-term aim of Abe and the LDP ; to alter Article 9, of-
ficially convert the SDF into the ‘National Defence Forces’, and allow participation in ‘collective
self-defence’?especially cooperation in military operations with the US, beyond the immediate de-
fence of Japanese territory. This would greatly transform the use of the SDF beyond previous inter-
pretations of the constitution, which allowed SDF participation in UN peacekeeping operations, UN-
authorised anti-piracy operations, and ‘non-combat’ operations in support of the US during the wars
in Iraq and Afghanistan (Vosse, 2012 : 161).
The case for this far-reaching change of the use of force by Japan has been justified by Abe
and the LDP as finally ‘normalising’ Japan’s defence and foreign policy, allowing Japan to
strengthen its national security in a more volatile and strategically competitive region. Japan would
thus be enabled to make a greater contribution to international peace and stability, by allowing it to
give full assistance to its allies in collective self-defence operations, principally with the US, as al-
lowed in international law, under the UN Charter (Kitaoka, 2013 : 5−7).
As previously outlined though, the LDP does not presently have the numbers in the Diet to ef-
fect constitutional change. It is also questionable whether a referendum to overturn Article 9 would
be passed by the public ; a strong pacifist strain endures amongst much of the Japanese public, par-
ticularly in the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and in areas enduring the burden of hosting US
military bases, principally Okinawa (Clausen, 2013). The Abe government has therefore already
taken practical steps to prepare for such a contingency, appointing a new head of the Cabinet Legis-
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lation Bureau, with the purpose of potentially reinterpreting Article 9, to allow participation in col-
lective self-defence. Since full constitutional change is unlikely in the short-term, existing legislative
and legalistic means are therefore necessary for the LDP to achieve its goals of a more active role
for the SDF (The Japan Times, 2013 b). However, this more assertive foreign policy direction of the
Abe government has already worsened relations with China and the Koreas, who view the LDP pol-
icy as a return to nationalistic militarism. Abolishing the pacifist clause of Article 9 would inevita-
bly ratchet up tensions even further, and so be very costly diplomatically (Wallace, 2013 : 504−
509).
Abe has already attempted to pre-empt this, in his foreign policy termed ‘proactive pacifism’.
This has been personally expressed through his high pace of diplomatic activity during his first year
in office. Abe has completed a hectic schedule of visiting all ASEAN member states within his first
year of office, diplomatically outflanking China’s influence in the region, with higher levels of
Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) pledged by Japan.
This was recently demonstrated in Japan’s swift response to typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines,
which saw the largest postwar overseas deployment of the SDF (Ordaniel, 2013).
The Trilateral Security Dialogue and Recent Regional Diplomacy
Abe has further developed the already deepening security ties with Australia, which has Japan as its
second-largest export market. Abe had his first official meeting with the new conservative Austra-
lian Prime Minister Tony Abbott at the 2013 ASEAN/East Asia Summit (EAS) in Brunei, where
Abbott declared Japan was Australia’s ‘closest friend in Asia’. Abbott offered Abe the rare privilege
of addressing the Australian parliament on his next visit, and aimed to conclude a Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) with Japan within a year. A growing level of defence cooperation, including a
higher tempo of military exercises was also confirmed in the TSD talks held on the sidelines of the
2013 APEC summit in Indonesia (Kenny, 2013).
However, the process for another series of trilateral meetings between Japan, South Korea and
China seems to have broken down, as regional tensions in Northeast Asia worsen. This diplomatic
standoff further intensified after media statements by Abe at the 2013 annual review of the SDF, re-
iterating that Japan has to increase its defence preparedness in order to secure itself from threats,
and to allow Japan to play a more active role in international security. Abe directly warned China
that Japan would not allow any changes to be made by force to the territorial status quo of the re-
gion. In doing so, Abe raised the prospect of Chinese drones being shot down if they enter Japanese
territory ; China angrily responded, stating any such action would be an act of war (The Japan
Times, 2013 c).
Relations between China and Japan have only worsened since, after China’s declaration of an ‘Air
Defence Identification Zone’ (ADIZ), incorporating the Senkakus/Diaoyus. Claimed to be in re-
sponse to Abe’s SDF review rhetoric, this is a highly dangerous escalation of tensions. As well as
sparking strong diplomatic protests from Japan, the US and Australia, China’s ADIZ has raised con-
cerns among Taiwan and South Korea. The US reiterated its support for Japan, stating that while it
(like Australia) does not have a formal position on the international legality of the dispute, America
regards the Senkakus as Japanese-administered territory ; their defence is subsequently covered by
the US-Japan Security Treaty (US Department of Defense, 2013).
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US aircraft have already joined the SDF in sending patrols into the Chinese ADIZ to reinforce
this point, and visits by US Vice-President Joe Biden and Secretary of State John Kerry to the re-
gion have reasserted long-standing support for Japan. Australia has also backed Japan, although this
led to some rather undiplomatic public criticism of Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop by Chi-
nese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, on her recent visit to China (Ryan, 2013). By contrast, South Korea
has expanded its own ADIZ, over which the US and Japan have not expressed any concern. How-
ever, the South Korean National Assembly has passed a resolution opposing any change to Japan’s
policy on collective self-defence (Welch, 2013).
These concerning developments demonstrate the urgent need for more active regional diplo-
macy to reduce tensions, to finally restore the diplomatic momentum required to ultimately resolve
the territorial disputes China has with its ASEAN neighbours in the South China Sea, as well as
with Japan (Marcus, 2013). Gesturing towards diplomatic reconciliation, Abe has proposed a summit
with China, and joint naval exercises with South Korea, despite the rivalry between the two coun-
tries over the Takeshima/Dokdo Islands. Abe’s diplomatic overtures towards ASEAN has continued
though, as Japan hosted its 40th anniversary commemorative summit with ASEAN, where a ¥2 tril-
lion ODA assistance package from Japan to ASEAN was announced ; a declaration supporting free-
dom of the use of the air and seas was also made, making a direct diplomatic stance against China
(Lies and Takenaka, 2013).
Japan’s National Security Strategy
Abe’s Cabinet has confirmed the more active direction of Japan’s foreign and security policy, an-
nouncing a comprehensive national security strategy on December 17, the latest National Defense
Program Guidelines (NDPG). It reinforces Abe’s ‘proactive pacifism’ foreign policy, where Japan
can contribute more actively to ‘the international peace and stability of the international commu-
nity’. The 2013 NDPG outlines a 5% increase in defence spending, to ¥24.7 trillion (US$240 bil-
lion) from 2014 to 2019 (The Japan Times, 2013 d).
In a concept termed the ‘Dynamic Joint Defense Force’, there will be redeployment of SDF
forces to the south, including an extra F-15 fighter squadron based in Okinawa, and more main bat-
tle tanks (MBTs) and artillery vehicles (mobile howitzers and rocket launchers) redeployed from the
main island of Honshu to Hokkaido and Kyushu (although both sets of weapons systems will be re-
duced from about 400 to around 300 each). The NDPG plans for the SDF to acquire up to 28 F-35
s (despite doubts over the expense, performance, and even eventual delivery of this complex next-
generation fighter), 17 Osprey aircraft, two more Aegis destroyers (to a total of eight), five more
submarines (to a total of 22), and possibly three Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). In
an overt demonstration that Japan is willing to use force to defend its claim on the Senkaku Islands,
the NDPG outlines the creation of a new amphibious brigade, supported by 52 new amphibious ar-
moured fighting vehicles (AFVs), having the declared mission of retaking any Japanese islands
seized by an enemy power (Asahi Shimbun, 2013 b).
The NDPG clearly states that China’s activities in the East China Sea are a matter of concern
which must be addressed?again asserting that China must not be allowed to change the territorial
status quo of the region by force. It also reaffirms the centrality of the US-Japan Alliance, and re-
commits Japan to increasing its levels of international security cooperation, including joint military
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exercises with Australia, as well as with a range of other countries, including those in NATO, the
EU, ASEAN, and India (Government of Japan, 2013).
Also part of this strategy is a review on easing Cold War-era restrictions on defence exports,
which have already started to loosen, which will allow exports of defence materials to friendly
countries such as the US, UK and Australia. More controversially, the NDPG encapsulates education
and publicity campaigns to encourage greater feelings of ‘love for the country’?an overt appeal to
patriotism and nationalism, which is worrying for critics, including NKP Diet members concerned
about a return to an aggressive, state-sponsored jingoism. Following the NDPG, reinterpretation of
the principle of collective self-defence is the next stage for Abe’s defence policy transformation.
This will be a more difficult and controversial stage though, particularly given the likely opposition
from the LDP’s more pacifist-leaning NKP coalition partners ; with its controlling bloc of votes, the
NKP is likely to be more decisive and crucial to the next step of security policy than the divided,
outnumbered, splintered group of opposition parties (Asahi Shimbun, 2013 c).
Conclusions?The TSD and the Future of Asia-Pacific Security
While confronting a range of domestic and foreign policy challenges, including constitutional
change, the LDP nevertheless seems set to enjoy a prolonged period of political ascendancy. After
the brief period of the previous DPJ government (2009−12), the LDP may yet be destined to be-
come entrenched again as Japan’s ruling party, returning to its long post-war period of parliamentary
dominance, with Japan effectively becoming a ‘one-party democracy’ once more. The DPJ could
very well split and fragment under the pressure of opposition, as the range of other small minor par-
ties ensures the LDP remains relatively politically unchallenged for the foreseeable future, with the
next general election due in 2016 (Curtis, 2013).
If the LDP finally does manage to achieve its aims of profound constitutional change, this is
likely to consolidate its power, and promote the agendas of its traditional support base, particularly
the business lobbies of large corporations, and influential sections of the bureaucracy, including
those of the ‘national security state’. The danger lies if this comes at the expense of the general
public, particularly ordinary consumers, taxpayers and wage earners, young people, women, the eld-
erly, and other vulnerable minorities in society, such as those still displaced in Tohoku. Vigilance
must be maintained to ensure civil liberties are not eroded at the expense of ostensibly protecting
‘national security’. The move by Japan to more assertive nationalism under Abe also risks provok-
ing greater instability in the region, unless far greater diplomatic care is taken. Unsurprisingly,
China remains highly critical of the direction of Japan’s new national security strategy, angrily
blaming Japan for increasing tensions over the Senkakus/Diaoyus (Tisdall, 2013).
The NDPG of the Abe LDP government, pledging as it does an increase in defence spending,
and an expansion of SDF operations with the US and Australia, therefore deepens the Trilateral Se-
curity Dialogue (TSD) as a mechanism supportive of Japan’s direction toward constitutional change
overall. In increasing a deterrence capability against China’s military rise, and its associated in-
creased maritime power projection capacity and more assertive diplomacy, a strengthened Japan will
reinforce the US ‘pivot’ of the majority of its strategic power towards the Pacific, which is similarly
being hosted and unconditionally supported by Australia. In doing so, such a ‘realist’ policy of de-
terrence is ostensibly aimed at reinforcing the stability of the Asia-Pacific region (Green, 2013).
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However, the diplomatic institutional mechanisms for forestalling escalation of tensions and po-
tential incidents into possible open armed conflict, remains inadequate. While regional Regional
Government Organizations (RGOs), such as APEC, EAS, and the ASEAN-related RGOs (ASEAN?
3, ASEAN Regional Forum, ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus etc.) have and can play a
useful role, more determined and vigorous diplomacy is still urgently required (Hiebert et al, 2013).
The TSD may also have the diplomatic potential to help assist Japan in improving relations, or at
least in reducing tensions between Japan and its two immediate neighbours, South Korea and China.
There are already indications that Japan and South Korea are improving some measures of defence
cooperation, particularly in maritime security, facilitated with the encouragement of the US. As Aus-
tralia also maintains close relations with Japan and Korea, its second- and third-largest trading part-
ners, it could also be more diplomatically active in encouraging reconciliation between Japan and
South Korea (Miller, 2013).
While relations continue to be more fraught between Japan and China, again, since the US and
Australia both have relatively firm relations with China, particularly at the leadership level (while
subject to occasional tensions), both could also play a more active intermediary diplomatic role, en-
couraging improved relations between China and Japan. However, the recent and present state of af-
fairs shows that much work needs to be done to even commence such a process with any real com-
mitment or effectiveness. There remains much scope for more proactive diplomacy to be exercised,
lest tensions escalate dangerously out of control, whether by accident or design.
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